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Summary findings
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Budina and van Wijnbergen develop a simple  1992-94  were masked by shifting government expenses
framework for debt, the deficit, and inflation to study  to the books of the National  Bank of Romania so that
the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy in  the government deficit did not fully reflect public
Romania's economy. This framework can be used to 1)  spending. In addition, the effects of delayed fiscal
determine the financeable deficit and the required deficit  adjustment were mitigated by exchange rate
reduction for a given rate of output growth, inflation  overvaluation and favorable debt dynamics. In the late
rate, and target for debt-output  ratios, and 2) to find the  1990s, however, debt dynamics worsened and the
inflation rate for which no fiscal adjustment is needed.  economy experienced significant real depreciation. That
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Initial  decline  in economic  activity  and sharp inflatfion  increases  are well-documented  stylized
facts of transition economy  from Central and Eastern Europe and Formner  Soviet  Union.' Blanchard
(1997)  discusses  the causes  of the initial  drop in economic  activity  and the so-called  u-shaped  pattern of
real GDP growth  in 5 transition  economies.  Deep drops in output and  large inflation  increases  occurred
independently  of fiscal  and exchange  rate policies  adopted.
Changes  in economic  structures,  caused  by transition  process  itself  was accompanied  with large
primary  fiscal  imbalances  throughout  the region:  tax revenues  drop dramatically  in early 1990s  because
of a decrease  in both tax revenues  and tax bases. Although  there was a substantial  cut in government
expenditures  (most notable subsidies  and public investment),  social expenditures  have increased,  so
total expenditure  cut did not match drop in tax revenues.  In early 1990s,  resulting  budget deficits  were
2 financed  primarily  through direct central  bank credit  to the government  at bellow  market interest  rates
which resulted in accelerated  money growth and inflation  increases in addition to the initial price
liberalization  shocks.  Budina and van Wijnbergen  (1997) dscuss the role of fiscal  policy in transition
process and  stress on  the  negative impact of  unsustainable fiscal policies on  inflation and
macroeconomic  stabilization.  Our paper draws on the theoretical  findings of Sargent and Wallace
(1981) Buiter  (1985) Drasen and Helpman  (1990),  Blanchard  (1993), Van Wijnbergen  (1991) Kawai
and Maccini (1995) about fiscal roots of inflation  and researches  the implications  of fiscal policy
sustainability  for inflation  stabilization  in Romania.  Many of the issues  in Romania  are familiar  for other
countries  as well.' Romania,  however,  is an interesting  example  on its own right,  because  it has by now
a history  of unsuccessful  inflation  stabilization  attempts.
Following  Anand, R. and van Wijnbergen  (1989), and van Wijnbergen  (1990) we develop a
simple  framework  on debt, deficit  and inflation  to study  the fiscal  and monetary policy  interactions  for
the Romanian  economy.  We apply  this framework  to assess consistency  between inflation,  monetary
reform  and fiscal  policy  for the Romanian  economy.
2A central  aim of this framework  is to derive a measure of medium  term consistency  between
fiscal and monetary  policy,  the required  deficit  reduction,  representing  the difference  between funding
requirements  and funding  sources,  given  the target debt-output  ratios and the real output growth rates.
We discuss  the medium  term impact  of real exchange  rate depreciation  and delayed  fiscal  adjustment  on
our measure  of fiscal  sustainability.
We also discuss  and show  the importance  of using a proper definition  of the public  sector  when
calculating  public  sector deficit.  Instead  of concentrating  on the central  government  budget deficit,  we
use the general government budget, including all the local governments' budgets and the extra-
budgetary accounts, which  might conceal a  significant part  of  the  governrnent expenditures.
Furthermore,  we are still  missing  a very important  part of the public  sector expenditures  and revenues,
such as, quasi-fiscal  deficit  accumulated  in the Central  Bank. Although  familiar  from other countries,
this issue was especially  acute in Romania  and we show the impact  of using different  concepts  of public
sector deficits  on the consistency  between monetary and fiscal  policies in Romania. This part of the
public sector is especially  important for the countries experiencing  severe fiscal restraints since the
governments  are  tempted  to shift some of their fiscal  expenditures  to the Central  Bank balance  sheets.
A key design  feature of this framework  is parsimonious  data requirements,  for obvious  reasons.
A second necessary  feature is the ability  to capture the type of monetary  reform  transition  economies
are going through; otherwise  much of the analysis  would suffer from structural instability.  The only
econometrics  required  is the estimation  of some components  of money demand,  which is becoming
possible  for most countries.  The focus is on medium  run consistency  given  a variety  of macroeconomic
policy  objectives.  In the model the primary  deficit  is taken to be a policy  parameter.  Debt management
is summarized  by targets for the debt  to GDP ratio for both foreign  and domestic  debt. Implicit  in this
approach is the view that lenders will impose such a constraint  because potential tax revenues,  the
ultimate  source  from which debt will  need to be serviced,  are obviously  lirnited  as a share of GDP. Base
money growth, for any given inflation  target, is endogenously  determined  by the path of the primary
3deficit,  debt policy,  the real interest rate, the financial  structure and the real GDP growth rate. The
model is designed  to indicate  whether  any given  inflation  (money  growth) target is consistent  with the
other policy  parameters  and structural  characteristics  of the economy;  alternatively,  consistency  can be
imposed  which  yields  the inflation  rate consistent  with structural  stability,  other policy  variables  and the
financial  structure  of the economy.
In what follows, Section 2 presents the analytical  framework  for assessing  the link between
inflation  and fiscal deficits. Section 3 elaborates  on calculation  of the public sector deficit for the
Romanian  economy.  The results of estimated  asset demand  equations  are presented in Section  4. In
Section 5 the model  is put together and applied  to a series of policy  issues, most of which have been
mentioned  in the preceding  paragraphs.  The  last section  concludes.
42  AN ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK
Fiscal  problems  are widely  recognized  as a key factor behind  persistent  inflation  in Eastern
Europe post-1989.  But little has been said beyond these generalities.  Deficits  need to be cut back,
but how far for a given inflation  target? What are the effects of a shifting  financial  structure, the
external  debt management  or the exchange  rate policy on the link between deficits and inflation?
Establishing  a framework  for answering  these questions  faces special  problems  in Eastern Europe
because  post-reform  data are short and pre-reform  series  difficult  to use given  the radical  changes  in
the economic  structure.  Therefore,  in this study  we do not intend  to determnine  how big the optimal
deficit  should  be.
A starting  point of the analysis  is government  budget  constraint 4:
D  +  iB,  +  iDC-1  -iDEp,  +  ((1 + E)(1i)-l)B,E,=  (1)
= AB  +  A(B  E)  +  ADC9  - ADEP9
On the left are the funding requirements:  the public sector primary deficit D plus the interest
payments  on the domestic  debt iB plus interest  payments  on domestic  credit to the government  iDC
minus interest payments on government deposits at the Central Bank iDEP' and plus interest
payments  on foreign debt, expressed  in terms of domestic  currency;  on the right are the financing
sources: domestic debt issue AB, foreign borrowing AB*E 5, changes in domestic credit to  the
government  ADCg  minus changes  in government  deposits  held in the Central  Bank ADEPg.  E is the
nominal  exchange  rate, i is the nominal  domestic  interest  rate, i* is the foreign  nominal  interest  rate.
Because  valuation  changes  due to exchange  rate changes  do not have any impact  on the government
budget  deficit  as conventionally  recorded6  we can  rewrite (1) as:
D  +  iB,1 + iDC'_1  -iDEpg,  + (1  + E)iB*  ,E-  =
=  AB  +  ABE 1 ABE  + ADC  - ADEP  2
Note, that Romanian  National  Bank, NBR, is the main fiscal  agent of the government  and therefore
5its profit and loss account should  be included  in total public sector budget. This part of the public
sector is especialLy  important  for the countries  facing severe  fiscal restraints.  The governments  of
such  countries  are tempted  to shift  part of their fiscal  expenditures  to the Central  Bank. 7 Therefore,
it is necessary  to incorporate  the Central  Bank's profit and loss account into our measure of public
sector deficit  (cf Anand and van Wijnbergen  (1989))8.  Analagously  to eq. (2), we can rewrite the
Central  Bank profit and loss account  as9:
iDCC-,  - i DEP9-l + i cP-1 +  (I + E)  NFA* E  (3=
A ADC - ADEP9  +  E lANFA*  + AEAVFA*  - AM + ACP
Now note that as in the case of the government  budget  constraint,  valuation  changes  due to changes
in nominal  exchange  rate do not affect the Central Bank' s profit and loss accounts, because the
exchange  rate effect  is canceled  out. We added up general government balance and Central Bank
profit and loss account  to obtain  total public  sector  budget constraint:  10
D  + iB,  - iCP_ +  (1  + E)i*  (B,  - NF'A)E 1 -=
=AB  +  E1 (AB*  -ANFA*)  +  AE(AB*  - ANFI,9) + AZI  - ACP
The integration  of the Central  Bank requires  two changes  in our framework:  First, we switch to a
net concept of foreign  debt, foreign  debt minus net foreign  assets of the Central  Bank. Second,  we
find that the Central  Bank credit to the government,  DC' and the government  deposits  held at the
Central Bank DEP' disappear when the Central Banks account is integrated with those of the
Government,  since  it is  just a claim  of one public  entity  on another.With  debt policy  defined  in terms
of target debt output  ratios, real  increases  in debt  are tied to,  the growth rate of real GDP, n:
A (B  /  P)  n (B /  P)
(5)
(B*-  NFA)EE  fl(B*  - NFA)E
j  indicates  the absolute  change  in the expression  that follows  (lik:e  a dot above a single  variable).  Y
6stands for real GDP. Dividing eq. 9 by P  (the domestic price level) and using some standard
definitions' 1, we obtain a measure of the real integrated general government and Central Bank
budget constraint:
(i  - if)  0  (i-  f)  +  (i  7fa)  - d  b- 1 (1  cP-  (1  +  e)  *  7*na 
(I  +  i)  0  +(1  t  ;2Z)  (6)
- Ab +  (I  +  e)ei(Ab  - Anfa)  + Am  +  )m 1 - AcP
(1  +  if)
where lower case letter denote real variables, corresponding  to  the nominal variables from the
previous  equations.  Subtracting  the right  from the left hand side of eq. 10, dividing  by real GDP, and
defining  a debt policy  in terms of target debt output ratios where real debt increases  are tied to the
growth rate of GDP, we obtain the measure for the required deficit reduction expressed as a
percentage  of GDP:
rdr =  [d +  r(b - cp)  +  (r  +  )(b*  - nfa*)el
[nb + n(b* - nfa*)e + (n +±  i)m  - A cP]
where r and r* stand for domestic and foreign real interest rates, respectively,  and e is the real
exchange  rate P/(EP*). Lower case variants  of variables  already  defined  as upper case indicate  the
corresponding  ratios  to GDP. For example,  b is the ratio of domestic  debt to GDP,  B/(PY).  The first
term between square brackets represents  the actual public sector deficit,  inclusive  of real interest
payments  on domestic  and (net) foreign  debt. The second term states the financeable  deficit  using
the two constraints  for the growth rate of the domestic  and foreign  debit  (which should not grow
faster  than the growth of the real resources available  for its servicing)  plus the resources collected
through the increase  in the monetary  base (seigniorage),  minus the real credit to non-public  sector
over GDP ratio. n is the real growth rate of the economy  and X the target inflation  rate. Therefore,
(n+  -r)m equals  the real value of the nominal  increase  in base money,  AAJIP.
Seigniorage revenues (n  + i)m  in turn  are a  function of the  inflation rate,  reserve
requirements,  liquidity  requirements  and asset demands 2. (n+;i)m equals the real value of the
7nominal increase  in base money, AM/P. The monetary base m equals all interest free net public
sector liabilities  - i.e. currency  in circulation  and commerciEd  bank reserves  held in the Central Bank
minus any claim  the Central Bank has on the non-government  sector. Under a fractional  reserve
system,  the demand  for base money  equals:
Mo  =  CU  + ES'=  RR,  Di 
Mo is the monetary  base, P is the price level and Y  is real income (GDP). Di are commercial  bank
deposits against which reserves have to  be  held at the Central Bank. RRD 1 are the  reserve
requirements  against these deposits respectively.  Cu is currency in circulation.  To  evaluate the
monetary  base as a function  of the variables  mentioned  we have  used a portfolio  choice model  of the
demand for Currency,  Cu, demand for demand deposits  DD,  Savings  deposits SD, and Foreign
currency  deposits  FD'3. In standard  portfolio  theory fashicon,  these asset demands  are a function  of
interest  rates on savings  deposits,  inflation  and nominal  exchange  rate depreciation:
py  =  fi('T,iTD,E)  (9)
where  Ai  for i from 1 to 4 are CU, DD, SD, and FD. We have  used a simple  financial  sector model
(eq.8) incorporating  reserve  requirements,  and other bank regulatory  policies  to derive demand  for
banks reserves.  The  total demand  for base money  is then equal  to:
py  =  fcu  (,  i*D,  E)  + X_, RRD, fDi  (t,  iTD,  E)  (10)
and it is used to calculate  the seigniorage  revenues  for different  inflation  rates, real output growth
rates,  interest  rates,  and for different  regulatory  policies.
Finally,  estimated seigniorage  revenues is expressed as a function of inflation,  real growth and
14 interest  rates and reserve  requirements
SR  = (r  + n)  MO  f(7r,  iTD, iFD,  IR  iRR1
83.  ROMANIAN PUBLIC SECTOR  DEFICIT
Initial  fiscal  crises  were common  at the beginning  of transition.  Unsustainable  fiscal  deficits
financed  by a rapid (mostly)  foreign debt accumulation  was an important obstacle for successful
macroeconomic  stabilization.  There were substantial  differences  between early and late reformers
across  the region.  Budina  and van Wijnbergen  (1997) provide  a comparison  between  pre- and post-
transition tax revenues and expenditures  for Romania and Poland which actually highlights  the
degree of initial fiscal crisis in Romania. Table 1 shows tax and expenditures structure of the
Romanian  budget  before  and  just after transition  process  was initiated.
Table 1  Fiscal Expenditures and Revenue changes in Romania
Budget Expenditure  Pre  (1989)  Post(1993)
Total Expenditures  42.7  3L0
Investment  17.6  3.9
Goods & services/wages  & salaries  9.8  11.4
Subsidies  0.4  5.5
Social Outlays  9.5  8.9
Other  5.4  1.13
Budget Revenues  Pre  (1989)  Post(1993)
Total Revenues  51.1  30.9
Tax Revenues  33.2  29.7
Corporate Taxes  6.3  3.5
Individual Taxes  na  6
Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services  18.9  7.4
International Trade Taxes  0.0  1.4
Social Security Taxes  6.8  8.5
Other Tax and Non-Tax Revenue  19.1  4.1
Source:  EBRD  Transition  Report  1994
As shown in the table, the main expenditure  cut comes from a dramatic drop in public
investment  (from 17.6 to 3.9 percent of GDP). Direct subsidies  increased  substantially  immediately
after  transition  (from  0.4 to 5.5 percent of GDP).
9As table 1 shows, there were significant  changes in tax revenues at the beginning  of
transition  as well.  First, turnover  tax was replaced  by VAT with flat rate 18 percent, but typically
there were numerous  VAT tax exemptions  (especially  for the agricultural  and energy  sectors). The
wage tax had an extremely  inefficient  structure:  it had 15 different  tax rates with a marginal  tax rate
of 60 percent.  Low tax collection  rate, inefficient  revenue  structure (in part because of delays  with
introducing  a personal  income  tax), numerous  VAT exemptions,  tax evasion  and economic  decline
resulted  in a shrinking  tax base which  exacerbated  current  and fuiture  fiscal  problems.
In addition,  Romania  was channeling  extensive  inclirect  subsidies  to targeted sectors (e.g.
agriculture,  energy) through low-interest central  bank loans extended and often never repaid by
commercial  banks. These indirect subsidies  had a direct inflationiary  impact in what they directly
contributed  to the increase of monetary base. These subsidies,  however, were not appearing on
government  books because  they were not accounted  for as government  expenditures  which implies
that primary  deficit  as reported  may  be significantly  understated.
As we will  show later, looking  only at government  balances  is therefore bound to give us a
distorted picture of public sector liabilities.  The framework we are using, on the other hand,
overcomes  this problem,  because  it treats both the government  and the Central  bank as one public
sector entity and provides an elegant  link  between public  sector deficit  and inflation  given  medium
term debt  management  and exchange  rate policy  objectives  and economic  growth.
We now use the framework  outlined  in section  2 to estimate  actual  public  sector deficit  for
1992  - 1994  which  will  be used as a benchmark  in the next section  to assess  the sustainability  of the
Romanian  economy.  We first calculate  nominal  deficits  of the general government,  Central Bank,
and then we aggregate  them to obtain  the total nominal  public  sector deficit.  There are three points
to bear in mind:  First, we note that, when calculating  the total public  sector deficit,  we exclude  the
liabilities  of one public entity onto another, since  they cancel out each other. Second, we are only
interested  in the net debt concept, the difference  between  general government  foreign  liabilities  and
10the Central Bank's net foreign assets. Third, in countries with large changes of inflation and
exchange  rate, valuation  effects  might be substantial.  Therefore  we have to single  out the changes
due to quantity  and to valuation  effects  (due to inflation  and exchange  rate changes) 15.
The second step consists of calculating  the real general government,  Central Bank quasi-
fiscal deficit, and aggregated public sector deficit as a percentage of GDP. These deficits are
calculated  by excluding  the inflationary  component of all public sector liabilities,  except for the
16 change in money financing from the nominal deficits . The real NBR quasi-fiscal deficit is
accumulated  either  through an increase  of the NBR's foreign  currency  liabilities  or through the base
money increase (e.g. direct NBR credit to  the government, commercial  banks refinancing  or
extending  low interest  rate credits  to the agricultural  and energy  sectors).' 7
Table 2. Romania: Nominal and Real Public Sector  Deficit, 1992-1994
NOMINAL  I  REAL
1992  1993  1994  1992  1993  1994
DEFICIT (A.+B.+C.)  15.11  2.55  7.89  14.02  1.49  6.59
A.  Money Financing  8.40  0.62  3.31  8.39  0.62  3.31
Base Money  7.77  8.73  4.38  7.77  8.73  4.38
Less Refinancing Credit
-0.63  8.11  1.07  -0.62  8.11  1.07
B.  Net External Debt  6.00  0.87  4.34  5.47  0.85  3.29
Financing  *
Gross  Extemal  Financing  5.49  2.58  2.90  5.36  1.09  3.22
Plus  NFL of the NBK
0.51  -1.71  1.44  0.11  -0.24  0.07
C. Domestic Debt Financing  0.72  1.06  0.24  0.15  0.02  0.00
D.  Change in Government
Deposits at NBR (net)  3.89  2.80  0.86  -0.05  -0.14  0.00
Memo:
General Government  Deficit  2.32  0.84  2.28  5.55  1.26  3.22
NBR Quasi-fiscal  Deficit  12.80  1.71  5.61  5.55  1.26  3.22
GDP (in USD billion)  13005  14761  27355.9
Nominal exchange rate,  460  1276  1767
Lei/lUSD
CPI  Inflation,  e.o.p. %  198  296  62
Note: The components of financing refer to changes in stocks (i.e., end-of-year  stocks less beginning-of-year
stocks).
See Annex 2 for details on calculation of the total public sector deficit in Romania
*Cross  effects are included in the net foreign financing
11The NBR quasi-fiscal  deficit  is accumulated  through extending cheap credits or implicit
subsidies  (at below market interest rates) to the govermnent and to particular economic  sectors
either  by printing  money  or through  foreign  borrowing(increase  o:FNBR's  NFL liabilities).18  Table 1
shows  our calculations  for nominal  and real public  sector  deficit  in Romania.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 represent  nominal  and real public  sector deficits  during 1992 - 1994.
As we can see from the figures, quasi-fiscal  deficit  did have at least the size of government  deficit
except  in 1993.
Figure 1 Nominal  Public Sector Deficit: Government  and NBR Deficit
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The bulk of quasi-fiscal  deficit  was financed  through money creation, and hence a direct
explanation  for triple digit inflation  rates in 1992 and 1993. The revenue from money creation,
however,  decreased  from 8.4 percent in 1992  down to 3.31 percent in 1994  which  is to be expected
given  the rates of inflation  in 1992 and 1993.19  Note that seigniorage  revenue  is the same  for both
nominal  and real public  sector deficit  because  not only real component  of seigniorage,  but also the
inflation  tax are used to finance  public  sector  liabilities  by  the real resources  of the economic  agents.
The next significant  item in the public  sector deficit  is nelt  external  financing.  As we already
discussed,  total public  deficit  requires  a switch  from gross to net external  debt concept,  therefore,  we
sum up government  and Central bank net foreign liabilities.  The bulk of net foreign financing  is
12external  debt accumulation.  Indeed,  Romania started  its economic  reforms with a very low level of
external  indebtedness.  However;  it did not restructure  initial  fiscal  imbalances,  but instead was using
a combination  of money  creation  and foreign  debt accumulation  to finance  its government  and quasi-
fiscal  deficits.  This worsened  significantly  its repayment  prospects  in the medium  term. As the figure
I  shows, the quasi-fiscal  deficit  is a substantial  share in the total consolidated  deficit during the
whole period 1992 -1994 and as IMF estimates  indicate  was a problem thereafter. A reason for
these large quasi-fiscal  deficits has been the indirect subsidies  to the agricultural  and the energy
sectors.  Therefore,  using only the general  government  deficit  figure  can show a distorted  picture of
the fiscal  stance  in Romania.
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In section 4 we illustrate  the importance  of the proper measure of real public sector deficit for
assessing  the consistency  between  monetary  and fiscal  policies  for Romania.
Finally, we have computed the net Central Bank liabilities,  as money financing miinus
domestic  credit  to the government  and the net foreign  assets.
134  ESTIMATION  OF ASSET  DEMANDS  FOR TBIE  ROMANlAN ECONOMY
Following Anand and van Wijnbergen  (1989) we specify  a portfolio choice model for the
Romanian  economy. We specify  demand functions for various financial  assets that are assumed to
depend on deposit interest rates and inflation:
An(  p.  ) = a, -. 6j i ln(I + xj j)
Py
Where In(Ai/PY)  represents the demand for various financial  assets to GDP ratios, (i = 4):
demand for  currency in  circulation, demand deposits, savings deposits and  foreign currency
deposits.20  Various financial  asset demands are regressed on a constant term, ai and opportunity
cost variables xj,i, with corresponding  elasticities, 3i,i.  The opportunity cost variables used in our
regressions are nominal  interest rate on savings  deposits, CPI inflation  rate and the rate of nominal
exchange  rate depreciation.  We used quarterly data for the period 1990:IQ  - 1996:IIQ.
To avoid spurious regression, we first checked the order of integration of individual  time
series. All the series are integrated of order one, which means that their first differences are
stationary. Because all the variables are integrated of the same order, there is an indication  that a
long-run relation  between them exist.
We applied a one-step ECM estimation  by regressing  the first difference  of each dependent
variable on lagged dependent and independent variables, on first difference of the independent
21 variables,  on constants, dummies  and time trends in some cases.
A[In(Aj)  =,  Lln(L)1 + 6  i[ln( + xjI1  + 1 +jA[ln(I  + x,)]+77  +  Dummies
Where Xi  is referred as an error-correction  term or adjustment coefficient22,  and Oj,i  = 5j,i/  Xi
are long-run multipliers  that represent long-run relation between estimated  variables and represent
the long-run effect on asset demands of a change in explanatory variables; yj,i are the impact
14multipliers and  measure the  immediate (short-run)  effect  of  explanatory variables on  asset
demands. Dummy  variables account for price liberalization  at the beginning  of 1991, and a dummy
equal to  1 after 1992.IIIQ to account for a sharp increase in foreign currency deposits. i=1,..,4
represent the financial assets demand equations: demand for currency, demand deposits, savings
deposits, and foreign currency deposits, and j  is the number of explanatory variables in each
equation.
Table A. 1 presents the one-step ECM estimations of various financial asset demands for
the Polish economy, for the period 1990.IIQ - 1996.1IQ.  Table A.2 presents the Wald test for
cointegration as shown in Boswijk (1994). The four columns in table A.  1 present the estimated
ECM equations for demand for currency, demand deposits, savings deposits and foreign currency
deposits. All the estimated equations except the demand deposits equation for the whole sample
passed the test for stationarity23  which allows us to find the long-run demand for financial assets
for the Romanian  economy.
The estimated long-run coefficients for the interest variables have the expected signs: a
negative impact of savings deposit interest rates on currency in circulation and demand deposits
and a negative impact of inflation rate on savings deposits. Exchange rate depreciation enters
positively  in the demand for foreign currency deposits, which reflects currency substitution at play
in response to nominal depreciation.  However, we found out that nominal interest rate on savings
deposits does not enter the long run demand for savings deposits, only the changes in interest rate
have a  short-term impact on the changes in  demand for  savings deposits. This suggests that
domestic interest rates still do not act as indirect instruments  of monetary policy implementation.
Inflationary  expectations  of the economic  agents have a dominant role in determining  demand for
savings deposits. For  the  foreign currency deposits we  observe the  phenomena of  currency
substitution",  which  is determined  by the positive  sign of the exchange  rate depreciation  coefficient.  In
comparison  with the other two countries  of Bulgaria  and Poland,  we note tLhat  although  this coefficient
15has the correct sign, it is not significant.  However, we have found a very significant  and positive
coefficient  of the D923=1  after 1992.3,  when the foreign  curTency  deposits  have  increased  sharply.  One
explanation  for these  coefficients  can  be the removal  of particular  fDreign  currency  restrictions  that have
prevented  the economic  agents  to replace  domestic  assets with foreign  assets.  For the case of demand
for time deposits,  the liberalization  dummy,  DUM, has positive  and very significant  coefficients  as well.
The DUM is a dummy  variable  that captures  the effect of a series of measures  initiated in the first
quarter  of 1991,  the most important  of which are price and foreign  trade liberalization,  a huge nominal
exchange  rate devaluation,  connected  with the removal  of the multiple  exchange  rate system,  and the
introduction  of restrictive  money  supply  measures  such  as thLe  raising  of nominal  interest  rates.
5  INFLATION  AND CONSISTENCY  OF FISCAL POLICY IN ROMANIA
In this section  we apply  the framework  outlined  in section  2 and assess fiscal  sustainability  of
the Romanian  economy.  Romania  is a very interesting  exarnple  of a transition  economy,  because  it
had relatively  favorable  initial  conditions  at the onset of the refonn process.  Nevertheless,  Romania
had a  sequence of  unsuccessful  stabilization  attempts. In this section, we  present our  fiscal
sustainability  calculations  and the obstacles  for achievement  consistency  between  monetary  and fiscal
policy. Fiscal sustainability  requires that debt to GDP ratio does not grow faster than growth
adjusted  real interest rate. 25 Blanchard  (1993) suggests  a set of indicators  which can be used when
assessing  fiscal sustainabiity  in a country: 'primary gap' which does not require any projections,
'medium-term  tax gap which does requires some projections of government expenditures and
transfers,  and average  primary  gap(averaging  over current  and future time intervals).  The 'medium-
term tax gap'  requires detaied projections of government expenditures and transfers. In  our
framework,  however,  we do assume  that primary  deficit  is a policy  parameter  so we do not enter in
detailed  government  expenditure  projections.
16The first indicator,  so-called  "primary gap" is the simplest  one and does not require any
forecasts. Buiter (1985, 1996) employed  this simple indicator  of sustainability  to developed and
transition  economies.  Budina and van Wijnbergen  (1997) calculated  sustainable  primary deficits  in
16  transition  economies,  based on three main  assumptions:  first, debt management  policy  targets are
summarized  as constant  debt to GDP ratios  (assumed  to be equal  to current debt-  to -GDP ratios);
second, they make simulations  for 1 and 5 percent growth adjusted long run interest rate (See
Buiter, 1995);  third, they  do make assumption  that at least in medium  term, governments  are able to
extract  on average  2 percent of GDP as revenue  from seigniorage  (See Budina  and van Wijnbergen
for further  details).
In assessing  fiscal sustainability  in Romania, one faces a specific  problem,  namely  that the
primary  deficit does not fully  reflect total public sector expenditures  in the Romanian economy.
Indeed,  if we assume  target debt to GDP ratio of 20%, growth augmented  real interest rate of 5
percent,  and long run seigniorage  revenue  of 1.29 percent of GDP, we arrive at sustainable  primary
deficit  at about 0.3 percent of GDP. For more optimistic  case of 1 percent growth augmented
interest rate we obtain a sustainable  primary deficit  of 1.09 percent of GDP. Duringl992 - 1996
primary  deficits  were much above 2 percent of GDP and only since 1997 there was an effort to
reduce  them and even  run primary  surpluses.
To summarize,  the primary  gap measure  showed  that Romanian  fiscal  policy  is unsustainable
even  if not accounting  for quasi-fiscal  deficits  of the Central  Bank. The framework  we apply  bellow
has the advantage  in that it gives us a consolidated  measure  of the public  sector deficit  (government
and the quasi-fiscal  deficit  of the central  bank). As we have shown already  in section  3, quasi-fiscal
deficit  is substantial  and often  larger  than  the general  government  budget  deficit.
5.1  Inflation  and Revenue  from Money Creation
In this section, we discuss the impact of inflation rate on financial asset demands, the
17monetary base, and revenue from seigniorage. Seigniorage reveinues  are derived as a function of
the  inflation rate,  reserve requirements, liquidity requiremenls and  estimated financial asset
cemands. The monetary base equals all interest-free net public sector liabilities to  the private
sector. These liabilities are currency in circulation and  commercial bank reserves held in the
Central Bank minus any claim  the bank has on the non-government  sector.
Table 3 shows  the Laffer curve shape of inflation  tax and revenue from seigniorage.  The
table gives us the estimated  financial  asset demands,  monetary  base, inflation  tax and seigniorage
revenue  for a given  inflation  rate. We have  used 1994  as a base year in our simulation  model.
Table 3 Estimated Asset demands, Inflation  tax and Seigniorage reve ues
Inflation  Demand for.  :  Inflation  Seigniorage
Rate  Currency  Deposits  Tax  Revenue
Demand  Savings  Foreign
currency
0  6.60  7.92  19.71  3.72  0.01  0.29
10  5.85  6.85  15.53  3.74  0.74  1.00
62  3.58  3.79  5.91  3.83  2.13  2.32
100  2.74  2.74  3.48  3.88  2.30  2.46
110  2.57  2.55  3.08  3.89  2.31  2.47
160  1.96  1.84  1.81  3.94  2.25  2.39
200  1.64  1.47  1.26  3.98  2.15  2.28
Inflation  tax is obtained  as a product of inflation  rate and the estimated  ratio of base money  to
GDP. We show the inflation  tax and seigniorage  revenue for an inflation  range from 0 to 250
percent.  The aim is to demonstrate  the limit  which the public  sets on revenue  from money  creation,
determined  by long-run elasticities  of demand for various financiad  assets w.r.t. opportunity cost
variables  (interest  rates and inflation).
The underlying  assumptions  here are: a 62 percent inflation  rate (actual in 1994), 8 percent
rainimum  reserve  requirements  for reserves  held in domestic  currency; 16 percent minimum  reserve
18requirements  for reserves  held in foreign  currency;  15 percent interest  rate on reserves denominated
m domestic currency and 3 percent on reserves denomninated  in foreign currency; a real output
growth rate of 3 percent;  2 percent foreign  inflation  rate; and zero real exchange  rate devaluation.
Maximum  long-run  revenue  from inflation  (inflation  tax and seigniorage)  is 2.31 and 2.47 percent  of
GDP, respectively.  The maximizing  inflation  rate is estimated  at about 110 percent. Any increase  of
the expected inflation  rate beyond this level would result in both lower seigniorage  and lower
inflation  tax as shown  in table 3.
5.2  Fiscal  Situation  in Romania  in 1994
In this section we illustrate  the impact of using the two different  measures of real fiscal
deficit  (general  government  budget and total public  sector deficit)  to assess the consistency  between
monetary  and fiscal  policies  for the Romanian  economy.
Table 4 presents inflation  rate, financeable  deficit(deficit  that is consistent  with all the
assumptions  and policy targets), and our measure of fiscal inconsistency  (which is analogous  to
'primary  gap' in Blanchard  1993,  because  it calculates  the difference  between  funding  sources(actual
deficit)  and funding  requirements  (financeable  deficit),  but it looks not only  at the primary  deficit,  but
on consolidated  public  sector deficit(including  quasi-fiscal  deficit  of the central  bank).
Table 4 Financeable  deficit and required deficit reduction for various inflation rates.
Inflation  Financeable  Required Deficit Reduction
rate  Deficit
General  government  Public sector deficit
deficit (3.22 %)  (6.59 %)
0  0.26  2.96  6.33
10  1.03  2.19  5.56
62  2.50  0.72  4.09
110  2.70  0.52  3.89
160  2.64  0.58  3.95
200  2.55  0.67  4.04
19The first column  indicates  financeable  deficit  for various  inflation  rates.  The second column  presents
the RDR measure when using the general real government deficit measure. When we  use
conventional  measure  of general  government  budget deficit,  3.22 percent of GDP in 1994,  for 1994
actual  rate of inflation  62 percent,  fiscal  inconsistency,  rdr, is estimated  at 0.72 percent of the GDP,
which  given  prevailing  real interest  and growth  rate does not reveal severe  fiscal  problems.
The last column shows the fiscal inconsistency  measure, rdr, when actual deficit is
calculated  as consolidated  real public sector deficit (including  quasi-fiscal  deficit of the Central
Bank). For real public  sector deficit  of 6.59 percent of GD]?  in 1  994, fiscal  adjustment,  necessary  to
restore sustainability,  rdr, at 62 percent inflation  rate amounts to about 4 percent of GDP! The
lowest value of RDR is achieved  at a 110 percent inflation  rate and does not reach zero for any
inflation  rate. As the last column  of table 4 shows,  RDR is positive  for the whole range of inflation
rates, or there  is no inflation  rate that can close  the gap betvveen  financeable  and actual  deficit.
Figure 3 Required  Deficit Reduction for Government  and Total Public Sector Deficit
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This result shows that the current fiscal  policy is unsustainable  in the medium run given
our assumptions  about real growth rate and public  debt to GDP ratio. This is an important  result  for
the case of the Romanian  economy  and illustrates  the importance  of using  the quasi-fiscal  deficit  that
20incorporates  the total assets and liabilities  of the public  sector. It supports  the theories about fiscal
roots of high and persistent  inflation,  since  it reveals  present, but hidden fiscal inconsistencies  and
will  cause  future  inflationaiy  pressures.
5.3  The impact of real  exchange  rate  depreciation
The cost of servicing  foreign debt also depends on the real exchange rate developments.
Therefore, we can analyze  the impact of varying real exchange rate depreciation on foreign debt
servicing  costs and thus on rdr, our measure of fiscal inconsistency.  We use as a benchmark real
exchange  rate peg in base year, and then we simulate  the impact  of real depreciation  and appreciation
of domestic  currency.  During 1992-1994,  Lei was considerably  overvalued,  but the situation  changed
in late 1  990s.
Table 5 presents  the impact  of varying  the rate of real exchange  rate depreciation  from 0 (the
base case) to 5 and then to 10 percent. It can be seen from the table that any positive  rate of the real
exchange  rate depreciation  will  only raise  the required  deficit  measure  for all the inflation  rates and thus
worsen  the consistency  problems.  At zero inflation  rate and subsequent  increase of the real exchange
rate depreciation  from 0 to 5 and then to 10 percent,  the RDR measure  will rise from 6.36 to 7.11 and
to 7.86 percent of GDP respectively.  Thus, capital  losses  on foreign debt associated  with any positive
real exchange  rate depreciation  can complicate  fiscal  adjustment.
We also assess the impact of real exchange rate appreciation  on the consistency  between
inflation  and fiscal  deficits.  This impact  is seen through a comparison  of the second column of table 5,
which shows  the rdr measure  for 10 percent real appreciation,  and the third column,  which shows  the
rdr for our base case scenario  with constant  real exchange  rate. The result is a decline  of the rdr, our
measure  of fiscal  inconsistency  for the whole inflation  range. The reason for this seerningly  improved
fiscal stance is that such a policy of real exchange rate appreciation  can decrease the foreign debt
21burden (there will  be capital  gains on foreign  debt).  However,  rujning large deficits  combined  with an
overvalued  currency  on a sustained  basis  can bring about large current  account deficits,  a depletion  of
foreign  exchange  reserves  and therefore  currency  crises  thalt  can bring  forward  a fiscal  crisis  as well.
Table 5 The impact of real exchange rate changes
Inflation  RDR with a real  RDR with a real exchange rate depreciation
rate  appreciation  el  %  e=5 %  e=1O  %
e= - 10 %  (Base case)
0  6.21  6.36  7.11  7.86
62  3.97  4.12  4.87  5.62
110  3.78  3.93  4.68  5.43
160  3.83  3.98  4.73  5.48
200  3.92  4.07  4.  82  5.57
5.4  The impact  of delayed  fiscal  adjustment
In this section  we use assess  the impact  of delayed  fiscal  adjustment  in a medium  term.  In this
simulation  we assume  that the gap between funding  requirements  and funding  sources is financed  by
additional  debt accumulation  rather  than fiscal  adjustment  for 6 years. We then compare  the measure  of
fiscal  inconsistency,  rdr, as of 1994  and 6 years later. As one miglht  expect,  the difference  between  real
interest  rate on debt and real growth rate is crucial  for debt dynamics  and for future  fiscal  inconsistency
(rdr after  6 years) respectively.
Table 6 presents  the impact  of the delayed  fiscal  adjustment  for base year 1994  real GDP growth
rate, 3 percent, and for a more optimistic  assumption  of 5 percent real GDP growth rate. Here we
would  like to illustrate  that the debt accumulation  process  crucially  depends on the difference  between
the real interest  rate and the real growth rate. Whenever  the real interest exceeds  the growth rate, as it
does in the base case, delaying the required deficit reduction translates into a greater adjustment
problem later (first two columns  of Table 6). At 62 percenat  inflation  rate in 1994, if the government
22postpones the necessary  fiscal  adjustment  for 6 years, at the end, the cumulative  measure  of RDR for
this six  year period  will  rise from 4.12 to 4.64 percent of GDP.
Table 6 The impact of higher output growth and a delayed fiscal adjustment
Required Deficit Reduction
Inflation
rate  n=3 % (Base case growth rate)  n=5 % (Simulation)
now  after 6 years  Now  after 6 years
0  6.36  7.16  6.16  6.57
10  5.59  6.30  5.41  5.81
62  4.12  4.64  3.98  4.28
110  3.93  4.42  3.81  4.08
160  3.98  4.48  3.88  4.13
200  4.07  4.59  3.98  4.24
The next two columns  show the impact  of real growth rate increase  from 3 to 5 percent on this
cumulative  measure.  First, such a GDP growth will increase seigniorage  revenues  and will therefore
decrease the RDR at 62 percent from 4.12 to 3.98 percent of GDP (compare the first and third
columns).  Second,  a rise in real GDP growth, other things  being  equal,  will  decrease  the eventual  RDR
from 4.64 to 4.28 percent  of GDP at the end of the six year period,  since  the debt policy  rule  will give
more  room for the government  to run the new debt (compare  columns  two and four of the table).
In late 1990s,  however,  Romania experienced  economic  recession,  average  growth rate during
1997  - 1999  is negative,  -5.8 percent of GDP. Romania  also experienced  a sharp increase  of sovereign
debt risk premium  which more than doubled  interest rate demanded  for new debt. Consequently,  the
difference  between real interest rate and real growth rate increased substantially  which altered debt
dynamics  and have adversely  affected  Romania's fiscal  position.  As a result,  Romania today is forced
to make  much  larger  and more painful  fiscal  adjustment  to return  on the sustainable  path.
23CONCLUSIONS
We applied a simple  framework  to analyze  the link between  inflation  and fiscal deficits  for the
Romanian  economy.  This framework  may  be used in two ways:  1').  to derive  financeable  deficit  and the
Required  Deficit Reduction (representing  the difference  between funding requirements  and funding
sources)  for given  output growth  rate, inflation  rate and target debt-output  ratios,  and 2). to obtain  the
equilibrium  inflation  rate for which no fiscal  adjustment  needs  to occur.
The main factor behind high and persistent inflation  rates and frequent exchange rate crises
in Romania since 1991 were unsustainable fiscal deficits. In  assessing fiscal sustainability in
Romania, one faces a specific problem, namely that the govermment  deficit does not fully reflect
total public sector expenditures  in the Romanian  economy.
Quasi-fiscal  deficits existed because a large part of subsidies to the agriculture and energy
sectors, as well as support to troubled banks, was given by the NBR in the form of loans extended
on very favorable terms. This shows that  there is a  shift of  subsidies or  other government
expenditures to the books of the central bank and that the actual fiscal policy has not changed
significantly.  These NBR indirect subsidies were usually so big that the total public-sector was
twice as large as the general government deficit. As a result, monetary policy has been inherently
accommodating  depending on any deterioration of the financial situation in these sectors thus
causing  permanent  inflationary  pressures.
We used both government  budget deficit,  and total public sector  deficit  (incorporating  all public
sector assets and liabilities,  including  Central Bank profit and loss accounts) when assessing  fiscal
sustainabiity  in Romania.  When we use as a benchmark  the real general government  budget deficit,
fiscal  inconsistencies  appear to be very small.  Inflation  performance  may suggest  that there is no link
between  fiscal  policy  and inflation,  because despite  small  fiscal  inconsistencies,  inflation  was very high
(62 percent  in 1994).  This seemingly  puzzling  result  disappears  once  we use the total real public  sector
deficit  in our model.
24These two experiments  illustrate  the importance  of the fact that in transition  economies,  a large
part of public sector liabilities  are often switched  to the Central Banks. The gap between funding
requirements  and funding sources at 62 percent inflation  rate in 1994 was 4 percent of GDP! This
reveals  large fiscal  inconsistencies  - in fact, there is no inflation  rate at which  fiscal  inconsistency  can  be
eliminated!
Fiscal  problems  during 1992-1994  were masked through shifting  government expenses  to the
books of the NBR and were supported  in addition,  by the policy  of overvalued  exchange  rate and very
favorable debt dynamics (relatively high real growth rates and  favorable interest rates). Fiscal
adjustment  was delayed  and first serious attempts  were made in 1997 - 1999. By then, however,  the
cost of fiscal  adjustment  increased  significantly  because  of worsened debt dynamics  and significant  real
exchange rate depreciation  which increased  the debt burden and necessary  fiscal adjustment even
further.
Real exchange rate depreciation is increasing the foreign debt burden and therefore the gap
between the actual and the financeable  deficit.  Real exchange rate appreciation, on the other hand
is  decreasing the  rdr,  our  measure of inconsistency. However, any prolonged period of an
overvalued domestic currency will put  pressure on the external balance and will cause large
discrete -depreciations in the  face of  depleting foreign exchange reserves which will further
complicate  fiscal management.
Any delay in fiscal corrections in the face of weak growth recovering prospects and fast debt
accumulation will only increase the gap between actual and financeable deficit. Besides prudent
fiscal strategy, which is  essential for  any macro economic stabilization an  important policy
recommendation  is to increase the transparency of its public sector balances and account for all
public sector expenditures in the budget.
25Acknowledgements
The first author  thanks the European  Commission  for financial  support  through  the ACE program.  We
also thank to Mr. Ion Dragulin,  Director  Monetary  Policy  and Stalistics  Department,  National  Bank of
Romania,  for his help  with statistical  data, and for his useful  comments  and suggestions.
REFERENCES
Aarle,  B. van and N. Budina  (1996),  "Currency  Substitution  and Seigniorage  in Eastern  Europe",
Journal of Policy  Reform, Vol. 1, pp. 279-298.
Anand,  R. and S. van Wijnbergen,  (1988),  "Inflation,  External  Debt and Financial  Sector  Reform:  A
Quantitative  Approach  to Consistent  Fiscal  Policy  with an Application  to Turkey",  NBER Working
Paper No.273  1.
Anand,  R. and S. van Wijnbergen,  (1989),  "Inflation  and the Financing  of Government  Expenditure:  an
Introductory  Analysis  with an Application  to Turkey",  The World  Bank Economic  Review,  vol.3, No
1:17-38.
Algoskoufis,  G. and M. Christodoulakis,  (Sep.  1990),  "Fiscal  Deficits,  Seigniorage  and External  Debt:
The Case of Greece",  CEPR  Discussion  Paper No.468.
Balcerowicz,  L. (1993),  "Common  Falacies  in the debate  on the Economic  Transition  in Central  and
Eastern  Europe",  EBRD Working  Paper  No. 11
Balino,  T., Dhawan,  J., and Sundararajan,  V. (1994),  "Payments  System  Reforms  and Monetary  Policy
in Emerging  Market  Economies  in Central  and Eastern  Europe",  JMiF  StaffPapers, 41, 383-410.
Blanchard,  0. (1993), "Suggestions  for a New Set of Fiscal  Indicaitors"  , in The  Political  Economy  of
Government  Debt, edd. H. Verbon  and F. van Winden,  Norlh Holland.
Boswijk,  P. (1994),  "Testing  for an Unstable  Root in Conditional  and Structural  Error Correction
Models",  Journal  of Econometrics,  63, pp.37-60.
Boswijk,  P. and H. van Dijk (1996),  Econometric  Analysis  of Dynamic  Economic  Processes:  7heory
and Applications,  mimeo,  Amsterdam,  Tinbergen  Institute  course material.
Budina,  N and S. van Wijnbergen  (1997)  "Fiscal  Policies  in Eastem  Europe", Oxford  Review  of
Economic  Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2.
Budina,  N. (1997),  Essays  on Consistency  of Fiscal  and Monetary  Policy  in Eastern  Europe, Tinbergen
Institute  PhD thesis  book No. 145.
Budina,  N. and S. van Wijnbergen  (1997),  "Debt Management  andL  Inflation  Stabilization  in Bulgaria",
Beihefte derKonjunkturpolitik,  Germany,  heft  45, pp. 93 - 1.09.
26Budina,  N. and Wijnbergen,  S. (1996),  "Fiscal  deficits,  Monetary  Reform  and Inflation  in Transition
Economies:  The Case of Bulgaria",  Tinbergen  Institute  Discussion  Paper TI 4-96-5.
Buiter,  W. H. (1996), "Aspects  of Fiscal  Performance  in Some  Transition  Economies  under Fund-
Supported  Programs",  CEPR Working  Paper, Transition  Economics,  no. 1535.
Buiter,  W. (1990),  International  Macroeconomics,  Cambridge  University  Press.
Buiter,  W. (1985),  "A guide  to public  sector  debt and deficits",  Economic  Policy,  Nov 1985,  No. 1.
Buiter,  W. H. (1993),  "Public  Debt in the USA: How much,  How bad and Who pays?", CEPR
Discussion  Paper No. 791.
Buiter,  W. (1997),  "Aspects  of Fiscal  Performance  in Some Transition  Economies  Under Fund-
Supported  Programmes",  CEPR  Discussion  Paper No. 1535.
Drazen,  A. and E. Helpman  (1990),  "Inflationary  Consequences  of Anticipated  Macroeconomic
Policies",  The  Rewew of Economic  Studies,  57: pp. 147-166.
Ghatak,  S. (1995),  Monetary  Economics  in Developing  Countries,  St. Martin's  Press.
Kawai,  M. and L. Maccini  (1995), "Twin  Deficits  Versus  Unpleasant  Fiscal  Arithmetics  in a Small
Open Economy",  Journal ofMoney, Credit  and Banking, vol. 27, No. 3.
Romanian  National  Bank (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994,1995)  Annual and monthly  reports,
Bucharest.
Sargent,  T. and N. Wallace  (1981),  "Some Unpleasant  Monetarist  Arithmetic",  The  Federal  Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis  Quarterly  Review,  pp. 1-17.
van Wijnbergen,  S. (1990), "External  Debt, nflation,  and the Public  Sector:  Towards  Fiscal  Policy
for Sustainable  Growth", The WorldBankEconomic  Review,  vol.3, No.3:297-  320.
van Wijnbergen  S. (1991),  "Fiscal  Deficits,  Exchange  Rate Crises  and Inflation', The  Review of
Economic  Studies,  58: pp. 81-92.
van Wijnbergen,  S. (1994),  "Eastern  Europe after  first five  years", University  of Amsterdam
27ANNEX 1 VARIABLES DEFINITION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
Every variable can be expressed in the following way:
AY  Xi
_  Ay +  -Y
where y denotes any of the variables. This equation says that the change in the nominal variable over the price
level is equal to the change in the real variable and the inflationary component.
Furthermore, we have used well known expressions that link the current domestic and foreign price levels,
price levels of one period past, the real exchange rate, and the exchange rate depreciation:
EP*  ("1  + E)(1 +  i)
P  =  (1+r)PI  e  p  (I  +(I  +P)
Data description
The data source for money demand estimates are IFS and NBF' annual,  quarterly, and  monthly bulletins. The
observation  period includes 1990.1 - 1996.1, on a quarterly basis. Money assets are classified as:
CU  currency in circulation  (bln Lei)
DD  demand deposits  (bln Lei)
HD  savings deposits  (bln Lei)
FD  foreign currency deposits.(bln Lei)
IAD  annualized interest rate on savings deposits, end of the quarter
Fl1  London official rate on 1 month dollar time deposits
YIN  calculated on basis of monthly average of 1989=100
EXR  nominal exchange rate, Lei per USD, end of the quarter
CPI  Consumer price index, end of the quarter, 1990=100
Dum=  1 for 1991.1  accounting for initial price and foreign trade liberalization
Dum=1 after 1992.1 accounting for implementation of more restrictive monetary policy measures (raising of the
nominal interest rates in the economy)
Variables  definition
LAjY=Log(Aj/CPI)-Log(YIN),  where Aj is CU, DD, HD, and FD
P=Log(UCPI/UCPI(-l)), AP=4*P, annualized CPI inflation
E=Log(EXR/EXR(-l)), AE=12*E annualized exchange rate devaluation
LIAD=Log(l+IAD/100) nominal savings deposits' interest rate
28Table A.1  ECM Estimates  of  a  financial sector portfolio model  for  the  Romanian
economy.
Explanatory  Variables  D(LCUY)  D(LDDY)  D(LHDY)  D(LFDY)
Constant  4.06  2.29  1.10  2.59
(2.92)  (2.59)  (3.19)  (3.69)
DUM, equal to one in 1991.IQ  to  - 0.22  1.13
measure the impact of price  (-1.76)  (3.31)
liberalization
LIAD(-1)=log(l+ideposits),  nominal  - 0.76  - 0.54
interest rate on savings deposits  (-  1.81)  (-1.25)
D(LlAD)=dlog(1+idepcsits),  first  - 0.82  - 0.21  0.65
difference  of nominal  deposits  (-1.27)  (-0.17)  (1.12)
interest rate
AP  CPI inflation  - 0.33
(-4.85)
D(AP), changes in CPI inflation  - 0.27
(-3.45)
AE(-1), nominal  exchange rate  0.033
depreciation  (0.43)
D(AE), changes in nominal  0.05
exchange  rate depreciation  (1.07)
D923, dummy  equal to 1 after  0.65
1992.IIIQ  and zero otherwise  (2.96)
LAjY(-1), one lag of log of  - 0.59  - 0.35  - 0.13  - 0.53
corresponding  financial  assets to  (-2.93)  (-2.62)  (-2.69)  (-3.55)
GDP ratio
RB  0.33  0.49  0.65  0.42
DW  1.78  1.98  1.72  1.31
*  For the first equation we have used dummy=  1 for 1991.1, to account for price liberalization in the beginning of the
reforms.
"*For the second equation (demand for demand deposits), we have used dummy q =1 for 1992.1 restrictive monetary
policy implementation.
*** For the last equation (demand for foreign currency deposits), we have used dummy=1 after 1992.3 to account for a
sharp rise in these deposits.
****t-statistics  are given in brackets under the estimates.
Table A.2  Wald tests for Ho being 'non - cointegration' hypothesis
D(LCUJY)  D(LDDY)  D(LEDY)  D(LFDY)
N, number of restrictions  2  2  2  2
F-statistics  8.599  6.839  7.255  12.603
(0.0079)  (0.0161)  (0.0139)  (0.0020)
Chi-square  8.599  6.833  7.255  12.603
(0.0033)  (0.0089)  (0.0070)  (0.0003)
t=nF  17.198  13.678  14.51  25.2
*The critical values are taken  from Boswijk  (1994)  and are for 0. 1 significance  level.
29ANNEX 2  EXTRACTING FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FINANCING
A2.  I  Calculation of Nominal Foreign Financing
The change in the value of  Net Foreign Liabilities (NFL) of the NBR can be due to the change in quantity
of foreign financing as well as exchange rate changes that result in capital gains or losses. When calculating the
change in NFL, however,  we are interested in quantity rather than valuation effects. The divisi on of the two effects
is done on a month-by-month  basis:
AG = G - G,i  (A. 1)
Eq.A.1 represents the total monthly change in gold holdings, including the quantity effect and capital gains or
losses, resulting from the change in gold prices.
Eq. A.2 represents the quantity effect of the change in the value of gold, which  is equal to the  change in the
quantity of the gold, times the NBR price of  gold one period ago:
AGq  =  (G  - G_,)Pg 1 (A.2)
AGV  =  G,(Pg  - Pg91)  (A.3)
Eq. A.3 and A.4 represent the valuation and cross effects:
AGc  =  (G  - G-,)(Pg  -Pg9,)  (A.4)
In an analogous way, we have calculated these effects  for the rest of the net foreign liabilities:
- Dollar NFL equals to the dollar liabilities ("Deposits of the BIS") minus the dollar assets (NBR's foreign
exchange holdings). Here we have used the end of the month nominaL  exchange rate (Lei per 1 USD).
- SDR NFL are just equal to the SDR liabilities ("Use of Fund Resources"), since there are no assets here.
We have used the internal NBR SDR rate (Lei per 1 SDR) as well.
.42.2  Real Quasi-Fiscal  Deficit calculation
Therefore.  all changes in public sector liabilities are broken down into real and inflationary components:
AG  AG  T  (Gt-l
Pt  Pt  I  +  p[  Pt-]X
where G is any asset (liability) of the NBR or the general government. The second tern  from the RHS of the above
expression  is subtracted when calculating the final figure for the deficit, except for the base money financing, since
the inflation tax also provides real resources for the deficit financing. When calculating Net foreign liabilities of
the government and  the NBR, valuation changes caused by exchange rate  changes  and  the  foreign inflation
.omponent are also subtracted (we have used the  real exchange rate for the  final figure  of the  deficit). This
decomposition  of the change in liabilities is also made on a month-by-month basis, and the total yearly change is
;btained as a sum of the monthly changes to avoid inflationary distortions.
'ro derive the operational  measure of the deficit  for the Romanian eccinomy,  we have used the balance sheet of the
National  Bank of Romania  (NBR).  There are two sources  of financing  which could  be extracted  from the balance  sheet
of the NBR: money financing, accounting  for the NBR refinancing  credit to the commercial  banks and foreign
financing. Domestic financing is obtained from the aggregate balance sheer of the commercial banks, since the
iomrercial  banking sector  was  the main source  of domestic  financing  for the public sector  within Romania.  As for the
aet  foreign government  liabilities,  we have  used an approximation  from the world debt tables.
Money  financing  As discussed  in Anand and van Wijnbergen  (1989), the proper definition of monetary  base is that
which consists of all net interest free liabilities  of the Central Bank to the non-public sector, which is the sum of
currency in circulation  and the commercial  banks' required reserves  held in the central bank, net of Central Bank
refinancing  to the commercial  banking system26:
Mo  =  Cu  + RR  Cp
.oreign financing The  Net Foreign  Liabilities  (NFL)  consist  of three prinmary  categories:  dollar denominated  liabilities
("Deposits  of BIS") and  assets (NBR's foreign exchange holdings); SDR denominated liabilities ("Use of Fund
Rlesources";  there are no SDR assets);  and gold holdings  (assets  side) 27.
,Domestic  financing  The  last item  we extract  from the NBR  Balance sheet  is domestic  financing. As Anand and
van Wijnbergen  (1989)  pointed out, the source  of domestic  financing  in Romanian  is the commercial  banking sector28.
30ANNEX  3  BASE YEAR PARAMETERS  OF THE SIMULATION  MODEL
Table A.3  1992  1993  1994
t, end of the year inflation  rate, %  198  296  62
n, real GDP growth rate, %  -13.6  1  3
KL,  base money  growth  77.17  86.04  62.9
RM/DEP, Effective  Reserve requirements,  %  40.81  27.9  22.41
MO/y,  adjusted for the end of year inflation%  9.75  6.73  5.61
7tMO/y,  Inflation  tax, %ofGDP  11.07  8.53  4.83
SR/Y, Gross seigniorage as % of GDP  7.77  8.73  4.38
SRA/Y, Seigniorage,  net of refinancing,  %  8.4  0.62  3.31
Real CU/GDP  3.9%  2.8%  3.6%
Real DD/GDP  5.9%  3.2%  3.8%
Real TD/GDP  0.8%  0.8%  5.5%
Real SD/GDP  4.04%  1.7%  1.3%
Real FD/GDP  3.22%  3.5%  3.8%
Time deposits'  interest rate  33%  71.5%  47.4%
Forex deposits'  interest rate  3.68%  3.3%  6.1%
Interest on reserves in Lei  15%  15%
Interest on reserves in foreign currency  3%  3%
Reserve requirements  on Lei deposits  8%  8%
Reserve requirements  on forex deposits  0%  16%
Real GDP growth rate (EBRD est)  -13.6%  1%  3%
Foreign debt interest rate  7%  5%  5%
Nominal  Government  NFL ($ bn)  2354  3111  4121
Nominal  GDP (Lei bn)  5982300  18835000  48338000
GDP in $ bn  13005  14760.9  27355.9
Real foreign debt to GDP ratio  18.1%  21.1%  15.1%
Real interest rate on domestic debt  -41.9%  -56%  -0.6%
Real domestic debt to GDP ratio  0.42%  0.65%  0.46%
Real total deficit  to GDP ratio  14.02%  1.49%  6.59%
31ENDNOTES
' See Balcerowicz (1993), Bruno (1993), Blanchard (1994, 1997),  van Wijnbergen (1994) amd Sahay and Vegh
(1995a,b,c)  and Budina and van Wijnbergen (1997).
2 Note that in early 1990s domestic debt markets were virtually non-existent or in a very rudimentary form,
whereas foreign financing was very limited or soon ceased  to be an option.  in some countries.
3See  Budina (1997), Budina and van Wijnbergen (1997) and van Wijnbe:rgen  and Budina (1999) and World Bank
(1999) for analyses of fiscal sustainability and inflation for the case of Bulgaria, Poland and the Kyrgyz Republic.
To capture  all the public  sector  assets  and liabilities,  we define  the government  budget  as central and local govermments
budget,  including  extra-budgetary  accounts  which gives  us the consolidated  govermnent  budget  constraint.
S.Analogously,  changes in value of the  government foreign liabilities can be broken down into quantity and
valuation components, and the cross-product term AB*AE  of second order:
A(B*E)  =  E_1AB*  +  B*_ 1AE  +  AB* AE
the first term on the RHS represents the change in stock of foreign debt, the second term  represents exchange
rate changes, and the last term is just the cross product.
6Any  increase  of interest costs  on foreign  debt due to nominal  exchange  rate changes will  be capitalized  and results in a
higher  stock  of foreign debt  expressed  in domestic  currency.
.An important  example  is when foreign  debt interest  payments  are switched  to the Central Bank without  being
accounted  for in the government  budget.
8The Central Bank' s profit and loss account can be derived by using the Central Bank balance sheet:
AAM=  - AC  =  - ADEP  + ANFAE  - AV
The left hand side represents the change in net interest free Central Blank liabilities to the private sector, AM,
which is equal to the change in currency in circulation plus the change in required reserves held by commercial
banks at the Central Bank minus the change in refinancing credit to the commercial banking sector, ACE.  The right
hand side represents the change in the Central Bank's assets, net of its profits (change in its net worth, ANW); The
change in domestic credit extended to the government, ADC 6 less the change in government deposits held in the
Central Bank, ADEP' plus change in Central Bank's Net Foreign Assets (or liabilities with the  opposite sign),
AINFAE.  The Central Bank profits consist of interest earnings on its  net credits (refinancing and  credit to the
government), iDC, plus interest earnings on its foreign assets (or alternatively minus interest expenditures on its
net foreign liabilities), iNFA:
iDCg,  - iDEPg- 1 + iCpj  +  V((+i*)(1+E)-1)NFA,E-  =  AAW
Combining the above equations gives us the Central Bank=s profit and loss account:
iDCg-,  -DEP- 1 + iCP- 1 +  ((I+i*)(1+tE).-  J)NFAl*4 E_  =
=  ADC2  - ADEPO  + A(NFA  E)  - AM +  A  CP
9.Note that  the changes in interest earnings on the Central Bank Net Foreign assets due to the  exchange rate
changes (LHS) will result in the same changes in the Net Foreign Assets (RHS), so they will cancel out. We also
take into account that the change in the value of NFA, expressed in domestic currency, can be due to the change in
the dollar value of NFA, change in the exchange rate, or the cross effect of the two.
'  See Budina N., and S. van Wijnbergen (1995)
See Annex 3
12  See Anand, R. and S. van Wijnbergen (1987)
13Typically,  such portfolio choice models include demand for government bonds as well. However, in the case of
economies in transition, bond financing is relatively new phenomena and the secondary market of government
bonds is either non-existent or in a very rudimentary state.
14  Note, that in this  way the  model allows for  different statutory reserve requirements on  different types of
deposits, which in turn might depend on their sensitivity w.r.t. interest rates and inflation.
15In this case,  all calculations  have to be done on a month-by-month  basis,  in order  to exclude  the monthly  valuation
effects.  The  yearly  quantity  effect,  in which we are interested,  is obtained  by summing  up the monthly quantity  effects.
1 6.See Annex 2
17 Most of these credits were non-performing and this has deteriorated the commercial banks' portfolios. They have
32been officially  recognized as a government debt later in order to clean commercial banks' portfolios.
18  Base money growth can be divided by two components: inflation tax and the growth of real base money. The
inflationary component could be compared, as a tax levied to the economic agents in order to finance the public
sector deficit and therefore, the inflationary component of the monetary financing should not be excluded. See
Buiter (1985), Anand and van Wijnbergen (1988), and Balino, T. and V. Sundararajan (1994).
19  Inflation rate acts like a tax on real money balances the economic agents are willing to hold, the hire the rate of
inflation, the lower the demand for real money balances, so above certain level this mnay  lead to actual drop in
seigniorage revenues. In addition, a change in the degree of currency substitution (the agents are substituting their
real balances in foreign currencies as a hedge against inflation) can impose a lower limit of the maximum amount
of seigniorage revenue which the government is able to extract from the public. See van Aarle and Budina (1996).
20  Note, that we expressed various asset demands as a share of income, assuming a unitary elasticity of income.
The income furthermore is approximated  by the index of real industrial production which was the only scale
indicator available on a quarterly basis.
21 Boswijk and van Dijk (1996) suggested the following algorithm:
i. Choose the proper lagged structure of the variables
ii. Specify  the following  equation:
Ayt = X yt-. +  6Zt-,  + 6oAzt +nt
iii. The unit root test is equivalent to a Wald test on X=0 and 8=0
iv. The above  equation  is equivalent  to:
Ayt  X (vt-l - OZt-l  )+ 8oAZt  +Tqt
Where 0=  - 5/  and is interpreted as the long-ran value of the variable coefficient, and the t-statistics of 6 can be
used as a test for its significance. This basic equation can be extended by adding a constant, linear trend and
lagged differences of dependent or independent variables.
22 The model is said to be stable if -2<X<0 . See Boswijk (1996) for a further detail.
23 We rejected  the null hypothesis of 'no-cointegration' for time and savings deposits and for foreign currency
deposits  at 10 % level of significance, and at 20 % for demand for currency.
24.Van Aarle and Budina (1996) provide empirical evidence  for the currency substitution in Eastern Europe. They
define currency substitution as substituting domestic with foreign currency for the purpose of store-of-value. Our
estimates are consistent with their estimates of currency substitution for foreign currency deposits, the difference
being that we have constructed a one-step ECM model and used the most current data available.
25 Buiter (1985), Blanchard (1990) sustainability requires the following inter-temporal BC to hold:
f d exp[- (r - n)tt  = -bo
or that the PV of primary surplus (-d), discounted at (r-n) should be equal to initial value of debt.
26.We therefore, extract the money financing from the liability side of the balance sheet of the NBR, as the sum of
the  following  items:  "currency" and  "deposits of  future  banks"  (representing  currency  in  circulation)  and
"interbanking liabilities" (representing the commercial banks' obligatory reserves, held in the NBR).
To get the net money financing, however, we must subtract the NBR refinancing credit for the commercial banks
(Cb).
27See Annex 3
28.The estimate of net  domestic financing  can therefore be  obtained from  the  aggregate balance  sheet of  the
commercial banks, as a difference between "public debt", or DC 5 and  "govermnent deposits", or DEPL.  The item
"public debt" is the net of "public debt by law 7", a result of an exchange of government debt for non-performing
loans held by the conunercial banks, which thus measures only the credit to the government used for its deficit
financing.
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